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     1. Introduction
Black-white intermarriage is a rare but increasingly common event. Among young and
married blacks and whites, 0.6 percent were in black-white marriages in 1980, but by 2000
this had increased to 2.1 percent.1 Over the same time period, black-white residential
segregation in the typical metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fell by about 13 percent. The
goal of this paper is to more carefully document the correlation between segregation and
black-white intermarriage.
This correlation may exist for several reasons. A two-sided marriage market consists
of men and women of various types looking for a spouse. Types can be de￿ned along any
number of dimensions including race, education, and wages. In the context of Becker￿ s
(1973) frictionless matching model, racial marital sorting arises from the relative supply of
types, preferences for traits which are correlated with race, and racial preferences in marriage
partners. Segregation could in￿ uence or re￿ ect each of these three sources of marital sorting.
For example, segregation could be related to the demographic composition of blacks
and whites in a market. Segregation is also known to widen the black-white parity gap
in education and labor markets (e.g., Card and Kreuger, 1996; Cutler and Glaeser 1997;
Guryan, 2004; and Card and Rothstein, 20072.) A wider gap would negatively a⁄ect black-
white intermarriage since education and earnings potential are valued in marriage markets.
Finally, it is plausible that MSAs with less social tolerance or preference for black-white
marriages are also more segregated.
In addition to the factors which in￿ uence marital sorting in a frictionless model, spatial
mismatch may be able to explain marital sorting patterns once we include search frictions.
Residential segregation may be a root cause of spatial mismatch if mutually acceptable
singles of di⁄erent races meet each other less often in more segregated cities. This physical
separation should lead to fewer marriages across racial lines.
The data reveal several interesting patterns. First, I demonstrate that with a variety of
speci￿cations and controls that black men, black women, white men, and white women in
more segregated cities are less likely to be in a black-white marriage.
More interestingly, controlling for demographics and economic di⁄erences between blacks
and whites actually strengthens the negative relationship between segregation and intermar-
riage among whites. This result may be surprising since more segregation is associated
with a wider black-white parity gap, so regressing intermarriage probabilities on a measure
of segregation without economic controls should overstate segregation￿ s e⁄ect. This is the
classic omitted variables bias. However, there is also a second-order e⁄ect at play. Hold-
ing the black-white parity gap constant at a wide gap, an increase in meeting probabilities
implied by lower segregation would have a small e⁄ect on intermarriage probabilities since
there are so few mutually acceptable pairings of blacks and whites to begin with. But if
the parity gap is narrow, the set of mutually acceptable pairings increases, and a change
in segregation would have a larger impact on intermarriage. Since larger parity gaps are
1These ￿gures are calculated using census data. The sample is noninstitutional, nonhispanic women aged
20-29 and men aged 22-31 living in metropolitan areas with at least 100,000 people, at least three percent
of whom are nonhispanic black.
2This literature can be traced back to Kain (1968).associated with more segregation, controlling for demographic and economic market charac-
teristics may actually increase the e⁄ect of segregation. The results in this paper suggest
that the second-order e⁄ect dominates the omitted variables bias e⁄ect.
To investigate the plausibility of this claim further, I attempt to identify those with a
greater propensity to marry across racial lines. If the second-order e⁄ect is important,
segregation should have a greater impact on intermarriage probabilities for these people. I
follow Rosenfeld and Kim (2008) and use whether a person is born out of state as a proxy
for a willingness to marry interracially. I ￿nd that segregation matters more for those born
out of state, a ￿nding which supports the importance of the second-order e⁄ect.
This paper does not attempt to identify any causal e⁄ect of segregation on intermarriage.
While there remains a signi￿cant negative relationship between segregation and intermarriage
after controlling for demographic, economic, and unobserved characteristics of the marriage
market, this residual cannot be interpreted as evidence for spatial mismatch. An alternative
explanation is that more segregated MSAs re￿ ect a preference for racial separation in all
spheres of life, including marriage. To impart a causal interpretation on the estimates one
must identify an exogenous source of variation in segregation. I leave this task to future
research.
Ever since Becker￿ s (1973) seminal contribution economists have been interested in who
marries whom and why. Much of the empirical literature in economics has focused on
sorting on human capital (e.g. Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles, 2005; Zhang and Liu,
2003; Pencavel, 1998; among many others). More recent papers have considered sorting
on religion (Bisin, Topa, and Verdier 2004), ethnicity (Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Meng and
Gregory, 2005), and race (Wong, 2003 and Fryer, 2007). Neither Wong nor Fryer analyze
the relationship between segregation and racial intermarriage, however.
2. Empirical Methodology and Data
I use variation in residential segregation across MSAs and over time to establish the link
between segregation and racial intermarriage.3 A basic assumption is that each MSA-year is
an independent marriage market. To focus the analysis, I concentrate on marriages between
whites and blacks. I leave the analysis of racial intermarriage between and among other
groups to future research.
The individual level data come from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. One di¢ culty
with this is that the U.S. Census Bureau ￿rst allowed respondents to select more than one race
category in the 2000 census. Rather than using a ￿one-drop￿rule to assign respondents to a
single race in 2000, I use census data from the Integrated Public Use Microsample (IPUMS)
(Ruggles, et. al., 2008). The IPUMS assigns a single race to multiple race people based
on individual, residential, and geographic characteristics.4 Speci￿cally, I use the 1% 1980
metro sample, the 1% 1990 metro sample, and the 5% 2000 metro samples from the IPUMS.
3I use PMSAs, or primary metropolitan statistical areas, whenever available.
4For detail, see http://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variableDescription.do?mnemonic=RACESING. The
IPUMS assigns a single race using methods described in Ingram, et. al. (2003).
2Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Isolation Index.
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Black Isolation Index (Ib) .57 .18 .07 .86
White Isolation Index (Iw) .92 .05 .67 .98
The data are from the 1980 1 percent metro, 1990 1 percent metro, and 2000 5 percent metro
IPUMS of the census. The sample is MSAs with a total population of 100,000 or more, at least
three percent of whom are nonhispanic black.
2.1. Measuring segregation
A number of measures of residential segregation exist (see Massey and Denton, 1988).5
For this study I use the isolation index, one of the two most commonly used measures. All
results are robust to using the dissimilarity index to measure segregation, the other common
index. The isolation index depends on racial composition within the neighborhoods that
together constitute a MSA. In practice, census tracts proxy for neighborhoods.
Suppose we wish to measure segregation between nonhispanic whites and nonhispanic
blacks: The isolation index for whites measures the extent to which whites have contact
with blacks as the percentage of the neighborhood composed of whites relative to blacks for












where whitei is the population of whites in tract i; white is the population of whites in the
MSA, blacki is the population of blacks in tract i, and n is the number of census tracts in
the MSA. The isolation index for blacks, Ib; is analogous. The isolation index ranges from
zero to one where higher values indicate more segregation.
All indices are calculated using summary tape ￿les from the Census.6 To reduce mea-
surement error, I use only MSAs with at least 100,000 people where at least three percent
of the population is nonhispanic black. The regressions are based on 172 cities in 1980, 193
cities in 1990, and 179 cities in 2000.
Table 1 displays summary statistics. The typical white person is more isolated from
blacks than the typical black person is from whites, a fact which re￿ ects the higher percentage
of whites in the population. Segregation varies considerably between MSA-years; each
measure has a large range and sizable standard deviation. Figure 1 displays a time series
of the segregation indices. Residential segregation has fallen in each decade since the 1980,
a ￿nding consistent with Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999).
5Massey and Denton identify ￿ve dimensions of segregation: evenness, exposure, concentration, central-
ization, and clustering. They conclude that the last three dimensions are relatively unimportant empirically.
After considering 20 di⁄erent measures of segregation, they identify the dissimilarity index and the isolation
index as the most appropriate measures of evenness and exposure, respectively.
6For the 2000 Census, which places multiple race people into separate groups, I use only the population
counts among those with a single race identi￿er. I have also experimented with, and found the results robust
to, using a ￿one-drop white￿and a ￿one-drop black￿rule to assign a single race to groups who identi￿ed
themselves with more than one race.
3Figure 1: Isolation Index Over Time, by Race.
2.2 Econometric Speci￿cation
The propensity to marry across racial lines depends on the market one faces. To cap-
ture general equilibrium e⁄ects, I run a regression using the entire data set and then use
interaction terms to separate out the e⁄ects of segregation by race-sex cells. The general
speci￿cation is
BWMarimt = ￿1Iimt + ￿2Iimt ￿ Blimt + ￿3Iimt ￿ Femimt + ￿4Iimt ￿ Femimt ￿ Blimt
+￿5Femimt + ￿6Blimt + ￿7Ximt + ￿mt + "imt; (1)
where the binary dependent variable equals one if the respondent is in a black-white marriage
and Iimt is the value of the isolation index for MSA m in year t for individual i: Within a
MSA-year, the value of Iimt varies only by race. Femimt and Blimt are indicator variables for
female and black, respectively. Ximt is a vector containing the individual, demographic, and
economic controls discussed above, ￿mt is a MSA-year speci￿c e⁄ect that captures unobserved
heterogeneity across time and space, and "imt is an error term.
The ￿rst four coe¢ cients are the focus of this study. ￿1 is the marginal e⁄ect of segre-
gation on the probability that a white man is in a black-white marriage. ￿1 + ￿2 measures
the same e⁄ect for black men, ￿1 + ￿3 for white women, and ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3 + ￿4 for black
women. All of these e⁄ects are expected to be negative. The signs of the cross-partials
(e.g., ￿2; which measures the di⁄erence in the e⁄ect of segregation between white men and
black men) are a priori indeterminate.
4Table 2: Percent in a black-white marriage, by group and year.
1980 1990
Group Percent N Percent N
Black men (ages 22-31) 1.7% 16,037 1.9% 14,394
Black women (ages 20-29) 0.4% 20,615 0.9% 17,637
White men (ages 22-31) 0.09% 98,971 0.1% 100,768
White women (ages 20-29) 0.3% 101,842 0.3% 95,661
2000 1980-2000
Group Percent N Percent N
Black men (ages 22-31) 3.6% 73,895 2.5% 104,326
Black women (ages 20-29) 1.0% 95,182 0.8% 133,434
White men (ages 22-31) 0.2% 444,382 0.16% 644,121
White women (ages 20-29) 0.7% 422,606 0.4% 620,109
The data are from the 1980 1 percent metro, 1990 1 percent metro, and 2000 5 percent metro
IPUMS of the census. The sample is noninmates within the speci￿ed age and racial groups.
2.3 Outcome and explanatory variables
Only black and white women aged 20 to 29 and black and white men aged 22 to 31 are
included to minimize bias due to location selection. The age range for men is older since
women tend to marry men older than themselves. Institutional inmates are excluded. The
propensity for blacks in this group to marry whites, and for whites to marry blacks, is shown
in Table 2. This propensity has been increasing over time for each group, but note that
black men are the most likely to be in a black-white marriage.
The probability that a person meets a particular type certainly depends on the relative
prevalence of types. This is captured by a variety of demographic controls. These include
the log number of singles in each race-sex cell and the log of the total MSA population to
control for congestion externalities. I also include race speci￿c sex ratios (single men divided
by single women), as these may in￿ uence the incentive to marry across racial lines, as well
as the general sex ratio, as this is known to be important in marriage and labor markets
more generally (Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993 and Angrist, 2004). Since the sample includes
all men and women in the speci￿ed age ranges, I include within sample marriage rates by
race and sex to ensure that the estimates for the coe¢ cient on segregation are not picking
up variation in marriage rates across space and time. Finally, I include the percent black
in an MSA and its square.7 Summary statistics for demographic controls are displayed in
Table 3. Black single men are relatively scarce, and marriage rates among black men are
lower than among white men.
Marriage is voluntary so it must be acceptable to both sides of a match. Whether an
individual is acceptable depends on one￿ s position relative to his or her competitors and the
distribution of traits among potential mates. Thus, I include a rich set of individual-level
and market level economic controls which may mitigate the relationship between segregation
and intermarriage. The individual controls include a person￿ s age, log weekly earnings, and
7Kalmijn (1993) has shown that the probability blacks marry whites is related to the percent black in a
nonlinear way. The unweighted correlation between the dissimilarity index and percent black is -.049.
5Table 3: Within sample MSA-level summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
ln(total MSA population) 13.1 1.0 11.6 16.0
Log of the number of single...
black men 7.9 1.2 3.7 11.7
black women 8.2 1.2 5.0 11.9
white men 9.5 1.1 7.1 12.5
white women 9.5 1.1 7.2 12.5
Sex ratios
(Black men)/(Black women) .80 .53 .04 10.00
(White men)/(White women) 1.04 .22 .52 2.46
Black men + White men
Black women + White women .96 .19 .53 2.00
Marriage rates...
black men .60 .12 .09 .97
black women .51 .13 .05 .96
white men .75 .08 .46 .96
white women .52 .11 .23 .90
Percent black .15 .10 .02 .51
The data are from the 1980 1 percent metro, 1990 1 percent metro, and 2000 5 percent metro
IPUMS of the census. Only the 544 MSAs with a total population of 100,000 or more, at least
three percent of whom are nonhispanic black, are included. The population for the log number
of singles, sex ratios, and marriage rates is nonhispanic women aged 20-29 and men 22-31 who are
not inmates. The percent black is calculated among all people living in the MSA.
dummy variables for whether an individual has at most a high school education and whether
or not he or she is unemployed.8
The market-level economic controls include wage distributions, unemployment rates, and
average educational attainment for each sex-race cell within a MSA-year. These statistics are
computed using samples with an age range wider than the estimation sample￿ s range because
data constraints make it di¢ cult to construct accurate estimates within ￿nely de￿ned cells.
Thus, one should interpret these statistics as the permanent components of the distributions
of education and labor market outcomes.
Speci￿cally, the average and standard deviation of log weekly earnings (in 2000 dollars)
are estimated among persons aged 16 to 64 who were not in school and who worked at least
one week in the calendar year prior to the census year. Earnings are de￿ned as wage and
salary income plus self-employment income. To capture the permanent component of the
educational attainment distribution, I use the percentage of the population over 30 that has
at most a high school education. Most people have completed their education by this age.
Unemployment rates are calculated directly from the Census among persons aged 16 to 64.9
8Including a full set of dummies for age does not change the results, so I simply include age as a variable
for simplicity. For similar reasons, I use a simple measure of education rather than a full set of education
dummies. Weekly earnings are de￿ned as wage and salary income plus self-employment income, measured
in 2000 dollars. I use predicted wages in cases where this variable is missing.
9I have also experimented with included measures of ￿idleness,￿ as in Cutler and Glaeser (1997). A
person is considered idle if he or she is neither in school nor employed. Including idleness does not a⁄ect
6Table 4: Unweighted labor market and educational distributions within MSA-years.
A. Average of log weekly wages (ages 16-64)
Group Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Black men 6.15 .19 5.43 6.78
White men 6.54 .16 6.15 7.33
Black women 5.84 .21 5.14 6.61
White women 5.94 .17 5.54 6.64
B. Standard deviation of log weekly wages (ages 16-64)
Group Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Black men .79 .13 .42 1.48
White men .77 .07 .58 1.13
Black women .80 .13 .32 1.51
White women .78 .06 .58 1.03
C. Unemployment rates (ages 16-64)
Group Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Black men .12 .06 0 .43
White men .05 .02 .01 .12
Black women .12 .05 0 .44
White women .05 .02 .01 .14
D. Percent of population over 30 with at most a HS education
Group Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Black men .58 .16 .14 1
White men .48 .13 .22 .89
Black women .57 .17 .05 1
White women .50 .15 .19 .86
See Table 3 for the source and selection of MSAs. For each MSA-year, the sample for wage data is
16-64 year-olds who are not in school and worked at least one week in the year prior to the census
year. Unemployment rates are calculated among all 16-64 year-olds, and educational attainment
is calculated among persons 30 years old or more.
7Summary statistics for economic controls are shown in Table 4. Within sexes, whites
have higher average wages and more education while blacks have higher variance in wages
and experience higher unemployment rates. Within races, men have higher average wages
but the other outcomes are roughly the same.
3. Results
Table 5 reports ordinary least squares estimates of selected parameters from equation
(1).10 Full results are displayed in Table 6 in the Appendix. To ease interpretation, I
include in Table 5 the estimates of the e⁄ects of segregation for each race-sex cell. The
standard errors in all of the regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered
at the MSA-year level.
The ￿rst column reports estimates from a regression that pools all the data without
any controls to form baseline estimates. The average marginal e⁄ect of segregation on the
probability a white man is in a black-white marriage is negative and statistically signi￿cant,
as expected. A 0.1 increase in the isolation index is associated with a .0048 percentage point
increase in probability a white man is in a black-white marriage. This is an economically
signi￿cant number since intermarriage rates among white men are so low (see Table 2). The
estimated e⁄ect for black men is twice as large. For women, the e⁄ect of segregation is
smaller than it is for men of the same race. While the column one estimate for white women
suggests a positive e⁄ect of segregation on the intermarriage probability, this result seems
pathological since adding additional controls in columns 2 through 5 changes the sign of the
estimated e⁄ect.
The column 1 estimates could be picking up variation in racial and demographic compo-
sition by MSA-year. To account for this, column 2 includes the demographic controls. This
has no e⁄ect on black men or black women, but it changes the sign of the e⁄ect for white
women and strengthens the magnitude of the e⁄ect for men. This implies that the more
isolated whites are from blacks, the more favorable the demographics are for intermarriage.
Alternatively, including demographic controls may have a second-order e⁄ect similar to the
one described in the introduction.
Interestingly, including economic controls has no e⁄ect on the estimates. This result
could be interpreted in at least two ways. First, one may expect that excluding economic
controls causes an omitted variables bias that overstates the impact of segregation. In this
case, one explanation is that variation in economic and educational outcomes is already cap-
tured by variation in demographics. Alternatively, the second-order e⁄ect and the omitted
variables bias could be canceling each other out.
Year ￿xed e⁄ects are included in the column 4 estimates: Year dummies capture national
trends in the tastes for black-white intermarriage that may also be correlated with segre-
gation: evolving race relations, other social norms, changes in fertility control technology,
divorce laws, etc. However, there is no change in the estimated coe¢ cients, suggesting that
the results.
10I have checked that the results are indeed robust to using a probit model.
8Table 5: Selected Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the E⁄ect of Segregation on the
Probability of Being in a Black-White Marriage.
Dependent variable = 1 if in a black-white marriage
Avg. Marginal E⁄ect (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
of Isolation for:
White Men (^ ￿1) -.048 -.076 -.075 -.075 -.102 -.067
(.003) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.008) (.003)
Black Men (^ ￿1 + ^ ￿2) -.098 -.094 -.093 -.093 -.094
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
White Women (^ ￿1 + ^ ￿3) .011 -.017 -.016 -.016 -.044
(.004) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.007)
Black Women (￿4
i=1^ ￿i) -.038 -.034 -.034 -.034 -.036
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Other Estimates:
Isolation￿Black (^ ￿2) -.050 -.018 -.018 -.018 .008
(.006) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Isolation￿Female (^ ￿3) .059 .059 .059 .059 .058
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Isolation￿Female￿Black .001 .0004 .0002 .0002 -.00001
(^ ￿4) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Isolation￿Black +Isolation￿ -.049 -.017 -.018 -.018 .008
￿Female￿Black (^ ￿2 + ^ ￿4) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.007)
Isolation￿Born out of state -.029
(^ ￿1 + ^ ￿2) (.002)
Demographic Controlsa No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controlsa No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed E⁄ectsb No No No Y Y;M Y;M
N 1,501,990
Observations are weighted using census person weights. Robust standard errors are clustered at the MSA-year
level and are reported in parentheses. See the section on data and empirical methodology for precise de￿nitions
of the independent variables.
aDemographic and economic controls are described in the text, and parameter
estimates are provided in Table 6 of the Appendix.
bY is year ￿xed e⁄ects and M is MSA ￿xed e⁄ects. Sample:
Nonhispanic blacks and whites who are not inmates and who live in MSAs as speci￿ed in the text. Men are
22-31 years old while women are 20-29.Source: IPUMS; 1980 1 percent metro, 1990 1 percent metro, and 2000 5
percent metro samples.
9national trends in tastes are already captured by changes in the demographic and economic
aspects of a marriage market.
Interestingly, the di⁄erential e⁄ect of segregation between races (within sexes) that is
present in all previous speci￿cations disappears once we include MSA-level ￿xed e⁄ects.
MSA e⁄ects control for unobserved di⁄erences in local marriage markets that vary by place
but are constant over time. For men, the absence of a di⁄erential e⁄ect can be seen in
the column 5 estimates for ^ ￿2; for women, this can be seen in the estimate for (^ ￿2 + ^ ￿4):
Neither estimate is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The estimated average marginal e⁄ects
of segregation for black men and black women remain unchanged, but the magnitude of the
e⁄ect among whites increases.
For men, the estimates imply that a 0:1 point increase in the isolation index is associated
with a 0:01 percentage point decrease in the probability a man is in a black-white marriage.
For women the same increase in the isolation index is associated with a 0:004 percentage point
decrease in the probability of intermarriage. The di⁄erential e⁄ect by sex is statistically
signi￿cant for whites ( ^ ￿3 = :058; s:e: = :004) as well as for blacks (^ ￿3 + ^ ￿4 = :058;
s:e: = :006): The larger e⁄ect for men may be due to the traditional role men have in
seeking out women rather than the other way around.
At this point the results seem to indicate that segregation matters more when both the
supply and demand sides of the market are more conducive to black-white intermarriage, at
least among whites. To investigate this idea further I control for whether a person is born
out of state. People who live in a state di⁄erent from their state of birth are more likely
to be in mixed marriages (Rosenfeld and Kim, 2005). Rosenfeld and Kim argue that this
variable proxies for a willingness to break taboos and part with community norms. Thus,
if segregation matters more for people with a greater inclination towards intermarriage, the
magnitude of the estimated marginal e⁄ect of segregation should be larger among those born
out of state.
To test this hypothesis, I run a regression of the form
BWMarimt = ￿1Iimt + ￿2Iimt ￿ Outstateimt + ￿3Outstateimt + ￿4Ximt + ￿mt + "imt; (2)
where Outstateimt is an indicator variable for whether a person is born out of state. The
other variables are de￿ned as in equation (1). If the hypothesis is correct, then the coe¢ cient
on the interaction term ￿2 will be negative and signi￿cant.
As shown in column 6 of Table 5, the data bear out this hypothesis. The point estimate
for people born in state is ￿:035 while for people born out of state it is ￿:068: Both point
estimates are statistically signi￿cant, and the di⁄erence between these is signi￿cant at the
one percent level.11
4. Conclusion
In addition to documenting some interesting summary statistics by MSA-year, this paper
reaches several conclusions. First, there is a signi￿cant negative correlation between segre-
gation and the probability a black or white individual is in a black-white marriage. This
11This result is robust to further separating out the e⁄ect by sex or race.
10negative correlation is present for black men, black women, white men, and white women. In
fact, once we control for demographic, economic, year, and MSA e⁄ects, there is no within-
sex di⁄erence in the e⁄ect of segregation on intermarriage probabilities by race. However,
segregation has a stronger negative association with intermarriage probabilities among men.
Another notable ￿nding is that it seems segregation as a larger e⁄ect when there exist
more mutually acceptable matches between blacks and whites. This hypothesis is supported
by two observations. First, the magnitude of the estimated e⁄ect of segregation on inter-
marriage probabilities increases among whites as more controls are introduced, suggesting
an important second order e⁄ect. Second, segregation has a larger estimated e⁄ect among
individuals who have a greater average inclination towards interracial marriage, as proxied
for by whether or not they are born out of state.
To be clear, this paper does not pretend to lend a causal interpretation to the results.
The signi￿cant negative correlation which remains after introducing a slew of controls is
consistent with the presence of spatial mismatch (i.e., that mutually acceptable singles of
di⁄erent races have a more di¢ cult time meeting in more segregated MSAs). However,
an alternative explanation is that segregation is a proxy for the tastes for intermarriage.
We cannot impart a causal interpretation on these results without identifying an exogenous
source of variation. Nevertheless, the results are very intriguing and suggest a fruitful area
for future research. Other avenues for future research include investigating how segregation
a⁄ects intermarriage probabilities between and among other racial groups, and incorporating
the new 2010 Census data when they become available.
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14Table 6: Complete Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the E⁄ect of Segregation on the Probability of
Being in a Black-White Marriage.
Dependent variable = 1 if in a black-white marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Isolation (^ ￿1) -.048 -.076 -.075 -.075 -.102 -.035
(.003) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.008) (.002)
Isolation￿Black (^ ￿2) -.050 -.018 -.018 -.018 .008
(.006) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Isolation￿Female (^ ￿3) .060 .059 .059 .059 .058
(.004) (:004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Isolation￿Female￿Black (^ ￿4) .0006 .0004 .0002 .0002 -.000
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) .002
Female (^ ￿5) -.052 -.052 -.050 -.050 -.050
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Black (^ ￿6) .037 .010 .011 .011 -.013
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.006)
Isolation￿Outstate (^ ￿2) -.033
(.002)
Outstate (^ ￿3) .031
(.002)
Demographic Controls
ln(single black men) .002 .002 .0008 .0007 -.006
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.0001) (.001)
ln(single white men) .0008 .001 .004 -.008 -.009
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.006)
ln(single black women) -.006 -.005 -.003 .002 .004
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.006) (.006)
ln(single white women) -.001 -.002 -.005 .006 .007
(.005) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.005)
ln(MSA population) .006 .005 .003 .0001 -.0001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002)
Percent black .032 .025 .021 .033 .037
(.012) (.013) (.014) (.023) (.022)
Percent black squared -.065 -.056 -.051 -.052 -.065
(.019) (.021) (.020) (.040) (.039)
Black male marriage rate .012 .014 .009 -.023 -.024
(.004) (.005) (.004) (.009) (.009)
Black female marriage rate -.015 -.013 -.009 .028 .024
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.022) (.021)
White male marriage rate .008 .007 .006 -.013 -.014
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.001) (.018)
White female marriage rate -.013 -.012 -.010 -.007 -.006
(.002) (.004) (.004) (.006) (.006)
Sex ratio -.004 -.004 -.002 -.009 -.009
(.005) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.005)
Black sex ratio .0000 .0001 -.0001 -.0000 .0002
(.0004) (.0005) (.0005) (.001) (.001)
White sex ratio .005 .004 .001 -.009 .012
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.007)
Fixed E⁄ects None None None Y Y;M Y;M
Continued on Next Page...
15...Continuation of Table 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic controlsa
HS education or less -.0001 -.0001 -.0000 -.0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Unemployed -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Age .0004 .0004 .0004 .0004
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
Log weekly wage .0008 .0008 .0007 .0004
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Average Log Weekly Earnings Among
Black men .003 .001 -.002 -.0003
(.005) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Black women -.0002 .001 -.000 -.0003
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
White men -.007 -.007 .001 .0007
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.003)
White women .005 .003 -.003 -.003
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Standard Deviation of Log Weekly Earnings Among
Black men .002 -.0002 -.000 -.002
(.002) (:002) (.002) (.002)
Black women .0003 -.001 -.000 -.0003
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.002)
White men -.010 -.010 -.010 .011
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
White women .012 .013 .001 .0006
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Percent With at Most a High School Education Among
Black men -.006 -.007 -.005 -.005
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Black women .005 .004 -.0003 -.0004
(.003) (.002) (.003) (.001)
White men .004 -.006 -.005 -.004
(.005) (.006) (.007) (.007)
White women -.0009 .005 .000 -.002
(.005) (.006) (.008) (.007)
Unemployment Rate Among
Black men .004 .009 .005 .005
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Black women -.001 .001 -.003 -.004
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
White men .006 .012 .004 .008
(.012) (.016) (.015) (.014)
White women -.006 -.008 .0002 .003
(.020) (.021) (.019) (.019)
Fixed E⁄ects None None None Y Y;M Y;M
aF-tests indicate that we cannot rule out the possibility that the standard deviation of log weekly earnings
has an important e⁄ect on the probability of being in a black-white marriage in columns 3-6. The other sets
of economic controls appear to matter less, depending on the speci￿cation. See Table 5 for additional notes,
sample, and source.
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